Network Bastion: email

Every year, as the holidays approach, nefarious individuals roll out old techniques to steal data and information from computer users. Each year that add additional tactics to their arsenal as well.

Each of us who has a computer is using that computer to access Internet locations throughout the day. Each of us is also unique and no one uses the Internet in the same way.

What you do on the Internet is NOBODY else's business. And it can be a big deal if you're not careful.

Here are a few tips that will significantly protect your privacy:

1. Log Out of Search Engines:

Many of today's popular search engines now require you to log in to access all their convenient features. Those features might include calendars, branded e-mail, file storage, and news sources.

Whatever you're searching for and looking at, you want privacy as part of those online searches, because your privacy is something you never want to loose.

2. Avoid Filling out Unnecessary Forms:

Ask yourself why the website you are on is asking for that personal information and think twice before putting it in.

Many sites store your information on their servers and not all of those servers are as secure as they should be. If you do fill out a form, make certain the only use of the information you enter will be by the vendor or website, and that it will not be sold to other sites or businesses.

Avoid completing forms or using banking sites when you are on public WiFi networks. Keep your personal information away from the public’s eye.

3. Be Careful What You Download:

When you download ANY file you are at risk of installing malware and viruses which can potentially track anything you do, freeze your computer and make it malfunction, erase your files and operating system or even encrypt your files and hold them hostage until you pay for an unlock key.

As a general rule of thumb, if you receive an attachment you were not expecting, or receive an attachment or link in an e-mail from a total stranger, DELETE the message. DO NOT download the file or open the link.

4. Be Cautious When Using Social Media:

Assume everybody has access to your site, and always will. Never post vacation dates in advance, and never post photographs of where you are while you are traveling. Burglars watch social media sites and frequently use that information to conveniently schedule break-ins while you are away from home.

If your birth date is public, you talk about where you were born, or give your parents names, you may have given them all they need to hack your bank and credit card accounts.

Think carefully before posting information or photos.

5. Use Common Sense:

This is probably the best advice we can give you. The Internet mirrors the physical world. What goes on in the real world also happens on the Internet.

If it's too good to be true, then it probably is.

6. Monitor Your On Line Reputation:

Regularly search for your name and see what comes up. You can also use an automated news-alert from either Google and Yahoo to monitor your name.

7. Clean Your Search History:

Everything you do on Internet is stored on your computer. Including: every website you visit, every photo and video you view and every chat message you send including passwords. All this information can be accessed by ANYONE.

Important that after every use you’ll delete all your tracks from your computer. This is done via your browser. Each browser is slightly different, but the information is available in the browser's help file.

When the hacker group, Anonymous, found out that Scotland Yard and the FBI were planning a conference call to discuss how to deal with Anonymous, and several other groups considered to be nefarious, the e-mail, setting up and giving conference call meeting instructions, was intercepted by someone from the group Anonymous.

Anonymous then used this information to their advantage to turn the tables on the FBI and Scotland Yard by recording the scheduled call and posting it on YouTube.

You can listen to the recording of this call, made by Anonymous, on YouTube

Read a rough transcription of the conversation here.

So how was Anonymous able to intercept an e-mail which should have been both encrypted prior to sending and sent via an encrypted network?

The answer lies in the fact that all e-mail is sent as PLAIN TEXT across the Internet. Unless the message is encrypted, either at the workstation, or via the e-mail server software, it is PLAIN TEXT and can be read by anyone who can capture the data during its journey.

Short answer: Either someone at the FBI got lazy, and there was no SSL/TLS on the FBI e-mail servers or one or more of the recipients has a very poor password on their e-mail account.

Whether the original sender of the message “forgot” to encrypt, his workstation was not equipped to encrypt, the connection between his workstation was not encrypted, or the FBI is not equipped to encrypt, this incident is unforgivable and, once an investigation has been completed, the responsible parties be should terminated.

In fact, this should not be under the control of the sender of the e-mail at all. With any government security agency, or even with any business, the process of encrypting e-mail should be fully automatic and transparent to the users.

E-mail, unless encrypted, is sent as plain text over the public Internet, I always advise both my hosted and consulting clients to “never write anything in an e-mail message you would not want to see in the newspaper or on TV.” They usually laugh when I say that but my concerns are being borne out by both the reports which have so frequently appeared in the new and the fact that there are so many new legal requirements mandating e-mail encryption in the banking, healthcare, legal, and ever increasing numbers of other business groups.

So, now that the proverbial cat is out of the bag at the FBI, what can you do to prevent your e-mail from getting into the wrong hands?

At ChicagoNetTech we run TLS on our SmarterMail e-mail server product. TLS is an extension of the SSL encryption protocol which actually allows our clients to both make an SSL connection to the e-mail server to originate their e-mail via POP, IMAP, ActiveSync, or our SSL encrypted web interface if so desire, originate their e-mail message, and send it through the Internet via the TLS security protocol.

TLS is a relatively new encryption capability on many e-mail systems and, as part of the transmission process, encrypts inter-e-mail server data traffic so it cannot be easily intercepted.

Whether or not TLS is supported by an e-mail server is very easily tested. In the case of e-mail sent to and from Timothy Lancaster, the originator of the conference call intercepted by Anonymous, we see the following results:

The US FAILS:

TestReceiver

CheckTLS Confidence Factor for "Timothy.Lauster@ic.fbi.gov": 0

MX Server	Pref	Con- nect	All- owed	Can Use	TLS Adv	Cert OK	TLS Neg	Sndr OK	Rcvr OK
mail.ic.fbi.gov [153.31.119.142]	10	OK (85ms)	OK (786ms)	OK (74ms)	FAIL	FAIL	FAIL	OK (1,020ms)	OK (76ms)
Average		100%	100%	100%	0%	0%	0%	100%	100%

The results in the grid above show that the FBI’s e-mail server FAILS the most basic of Internet e-mail security, TLS. The e-mail server used for the FBI’s domain, IC.FBI.GOV does not have even the most basic of security enabled.

Repeating this TLS check test for Stewart.Garrick@met.police.uk shows the same thing:

ENGLAND

FAILS:

TestReceiver

CheckTLS Confidence Factor for "Stewart.Garrick@met.police.uk": 0

MX Server	Pref	Con- nect	All- owed	Can Use	TLS Adv	Cert OK	TLS Neg	Sndr OK	Rcvr OK
mail3.met.police.uk [212.74.97.198]	15	OK (180ms)	OK (167ms)	OK (169ms)	FAIL	FAIL	FAIL	OK (682ms)	OK (163ms)
mail4.met.police.uk [212.74.97.212]	15	OK (181ms)	OK (165ms)	OK (164ms)	FAIL	FAIL	FAIL	OK (673ms)	OK (165ms)
mxbackup.uk.cw.net [195.92.195.234]	20	OK (155ms)	OK (241ms)	OK (144ms)	FAIL	FAIL	FAIL	OK (686ms)	OK (782ms)
Average		100%	100%	100%	0%	0%	0%	100%	100%

The e-mail servers for the domain MET.POLICE.UK FAIL the TLS test and do not have the capability to encrypt inter-domain e-mail messages.

Validating against other domains included in the e-mail message intercepted by Anonymous, we the following results on the part of the e-mail servers used by other high-level security officials in other countries who were invited to participate in the conference call:

FRANCE PASSES:

TestReceiver

CheckTLS Confidence Factor for "olivier.nael@interieur.gouv.fr": 90

MX Server	Pref	Con- nect	All- owed	Can Use	TLS Adv	Cert OK	TLS Neg	Sndr OK	Rcvr OK
tigre.interieur.gouv.fr [212.234.218.76]	10	OK (172ms)	OK (337ms)	OK (162ms)	OK (161ms)	FAIL	OK (1,433ms)	OK (163ms)	FAIL
Average		100%	100%	100%	100%	0%	100%	100%	0%

Note: Cert failures do not affect TLS encryption, but may mean the site isn't who they say they are.

NOTE that the CERT failure means that the TLS test was unable to verify the e-mail address. They may be because it was changed since being published by Anonymous or that the domain INTERIEUR.GOUV.FR runs Greylisting. If we test in a few minutes and the CERT OK changes to PASS, then we will know they run Greylisting.

The NETHERLANDS PASSES:

TestReceiver

CheckTLS Confidence Factor for "michel@nhtcu.nl": 90

MX Server	Pref	Con- nect	All- owed	Can Use	TLS Adv	Cert OK	TLS Neg	Sndr OK	Rcvr OK
pochta3.nhtcu.nl [83.149.67.40]	8	OK (154ms)	OK (688ms)	OK (144ms)	OK (143ms)	FAIL	OK (1,663ms)	OK (150ms)	OK (149ms)
pochta4.nhtcu.nl [83.149.94.112]	9	OK (154ms)	OK (159ms)	OK (144ms)	OK (145ms)	FAIL	OK (1,138ms)	OK (150ms)	OK (151ms)
Average		100%	100%	100%	100%	0%	100%	100%	100%

GERMANY PASSES:

TestReceiver

CheckTLS Confidence Factor for "andre.dornbusch@iuk.bka.de": 90

MX Server	Pref	Con- nect	All- owed	Can Use	TLS Adv	Cert OK	TLS Neg	Sndr OK	Rcvr OK
smtp.ts-businessmail.de [217.150.155.10]	100	OK (209ms)	OK (696ms)	OK (174ms)	OK (175ms)	FAIL	OK (1,934ms)	OK (404ms)	FAIL
Average		100%	100%	100%	100%	0%	100%	100%	0%

SWEDEN FAILS:

TestReceiver

CheckTLS Confidence Factor for "peter.ericson@rkp.police.se": 0

MX Server	Pref	Con- nect	All- owed	Can Use	TLS Adv	Cert OK	TLS Neg	Sndr OK	Rcvr OK
mail.telia.com [62.20.233.128]	10	OK (193ms)	OK (182ms)	OK (178ms)	FAIL	FAIL	FAIL	OK (1,118ms)	FAIL
Average		100%	100%	100%	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%

Getting back to that "what happened" question asked at the top of this posting, it looks like neither the FBI, nor several other high-security installations run TLS!

While I would certainly not consider TLS to be the only security protocol implemented for communications between international security agencies, it should, at the very least, be a jumping off point for any secure e-mail communication.

No matter what kind of e-mail server you are running, or what purpose you are running your e-mail for: personal, business, not-for-profit, whatever the use, always remember that e-mail is transmitted as plain text across the internet and should always be encrypted.

The level of encryption depends on both regulatory requirements and what your business does. HIPAA / HITECH, Sarbanes Oxley, and government regulations all have similar, and, because of highly publicized incidents like the one outlined above, merging requirements.

Protect yourself now. Check the status of your e-mail encryption and make certain you are running TLS on your mail servers – as a very MINIMUM requirement.

You can check your e-mail server's TLS capabilities at: http://www.checktls.com/perl/TestReceiver.pl.

Select "CertDetail" from the drop-down box for intensive result reporting.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me and we can discuss your e-mail and network security to make certain your business is protected.

Now for the fun part, the actual e-mail intercepted by Anonymous is listed below.

NOTE: Because this has been previously published on the Internet by Anonymous, we decided to keep all of the data exactly as previously published:

======================================
MIME-Version: 1.0
acceptlanguage: en-US
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
Subject: Anon-Lulz International Coordination Call
Date: Fri, 13 Jan 2012 19:21:49 -0000
X-MS-Has-Attach:
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator:
thread-topic: Anon-Lulz International Coordination Call
From: "Lauster, Timothy F. Jr." Timothy.Lauster@ic.fbi.gov To: "Reichard, Gerald A." Gerald.Reichard@ic.fbi.gov,
paul.hoare2@met.police.uk,
Raymond.Massie@met.police.uk,
trevor.dickey@met.pnn.police.uk,
Stewart.Garrick@met.police.uk,
"Gillen, Paul G" paul.g.gillen@garda.ie,
"Gallagher, Colm" colm.gallagher@garda.ie,
pim@nhtcu.nl,
Gea@nhtcu.nl,
michel@nhtcu.nl,
olivier.nael@interieur.gouv.fr,
olivier.moalic@interieur.gouv.fr,
thierry.mezenguel@interieur.gouv.fr,
andre.dornbusch@iuk.bka.de,
peter.ericson@rkp.police.se,
stefan.kronqvist@rkp.police.se,
ulrika.sundling@rkp.police.se,
Jaap.Oss@europol.europa.eu,
valentin.gatejel@europol.europa.eu,
"Helman, Bruce C. Jr." Bruce.Helman@ic.fbi.gov,
"Sporre, Eric W." Eric.Sporre@ic.fbi.gov,
"Buckler, Lesley" Lesley.Buckler@ic.fbi.gov,
"Geeslin, Robert C." Robert.Geeslin@ic.fbi.gov,
"Plunkett, William R." William.Plunkett@ic.fbi.gov,
"Roberts, Stewart B." Stewart.Roberts@ic.fbi.gov,
"Brassanini, David" David.Brassanini@ic.fbi.gov,
"Stangl, Christopher K." Christopher.Stangl@ic.fbi.gov,
"Patel, Milan" Milan.Patel@ic.fbi.gov,
"Ng, William T." William.Ng@ic.fbi.gov,
"Adams, Melanie" Melanie.Adams@ic.fbi.gov,
"Culp, Mark A." Mark.Culp@ic.fbi.gov,
"Arico, Nicholas J." Nicholas.Arico@ic.fbi.gov,
"Tabatabaian, Ramyar" Ramyar.Tabatabaian@ic.fbi.gov,
"Penalosa, Jensen" Jensen.Penalosa@ic.fbi.gov,
"Bales, Will" Will.Bales@ic.fbi.gov,
"Burton, Kevin C." Kevin.Burton@ic.fbi.gov,
"Nail, Michael A." Michael.Nail@ic.fbi.gov,
"Grasso, Thomas X." Thomas.Grasso@ic.fbi.gov,
"Thomas, Christopher T." Christopher.Thomas@ic.fbi.gov,
"Caruthers, John" John.Caruthers@ic.fbi.gov,
"Phoenix, Conor I." Conor.Phoenix@ic.fbi.gov,
"Hunt, Chad R." Chad.Hunt@ic.fbi.gov,
"Willett, Bryan G." Bryan.Willett@ic.fbi.gov,
"Patrick, Kory D." Kory.Patrick@ic.fbi.gov

All,

A conference call is planned for next Tuesday (January 17, 2012) to discuss the on-going investigations related to Anonymous, Lulzsec, Antisec, and other associated splinter groups

The conference call was moved to Tuesday due to a US holiday on Monday.

Date: Tuesday, January 17, 2012
Time: 4:00 PM GMT=20
BridgeTN: 202-393-2430
Access Code: 6513211#

Please contact me if you have any questions.

Regards,
Tim

SSA Timothy F. Lauster, Jr
Federal Bureau of Investigation
202-651-3211 (w)
202-651-3193 (f)

Protect your e-mail server today

- ENCRYPT YOUR COMMUNICATIONS!

======================================

Network Bastion

02 November 2013

Keep Yourself Safe on the Internet

06 February 2012

Anonymous vs the FBI . . .